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Medical savings accounts (MSAs) belong to a larger class of incentive-based
health care plans. Using a model that allows the consumer to invest in healthy
activities, we examine the efficiency properties of incentive plans and compare
them to traditional full- coverage and deductible plans, under both experience
rating and community rating. The model also is extended to include utilization
of preventive health care. Properly constructed incentive plans have the capacity
to induce socially efficient levels of healthy activities and preventive care, raising
the expected wealth of consumers without reducing insurers’ profits.
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The Economics of Incentive-Based Health Care Plans
Dennis Heffley and Thomas Miceli
Department of Economics, University of Connecticut
July 13, 1997
ABSTRACT
Medical savings accounts (MSAs) belong to a larger class of incentive-based health care plans.  Using
a model that allows the consumer to invest in healthy activities, we examine the efficiency properties of incentive
plans and compare them to traditional full-coverage and deductible plans, under both experience rating and
community rating.  The model also is extended to include utilization of preventive health care.  Properly
constructed incentive plans have the capacity to induce socially efficient levels of healthy activities and preventive
care, raising the expected wealth of consumers without reducing insurers’ profits. 
1. Background.
Comprehensive plans to overhaul the health care system have given way to "incremental"
reforms, such as those designed to increase the portability of employment-based health insurance
and protection for persons with pre-existing conditions.  A major sticking-point in the debate of
incremental reforms has been the effort to expand the availability of medical savings accounts
(MSAs).1  MSAs exist in various forms, mostly within self-insured firms, but certain features are
common.  MSA plans typically replace more comprehensive coverage with catastrophic or high-
deductible coverage, coupled with stronger personal incentives to prudently utilize routine care
and to adopt a healthier lifestyle.  Consequently, MSAs can be viewed as one example of a larger
class of incentive-based health insurance plans.
Incentive plans are not new.  An interesting U.S. example is the Mendocino (or "Stay-
Well") Plan that was adopted by the Mendocino County Office of Education in the late 1970s.
Unhappy with rising health insurance premiums and facing the revenue pressure of Proposition
13, a California property tax limitation, public school officials in Mendocino County replaced their
employees’ first-dollar coverage Blue Shield plan with a $500-deductible policy from the same
insurer.  Premium savings of almost $480 per worker were used by the employer to establish a
"side-fund."  The fund was used to self-insure the first $500 of health care bills for each employee;
amounts beyond this were still covered by Blue Shield.  Apart from the change in payer for the
                                                 
11. Pauly and Goodman (1995) have offered a specific MSA proposal that has drawn some lively response.  See
Health Affairs, 14 (Summer 1995), 260-279.  Newhouse (1996) also offers a concise description of a voluntary
MSA option for Medicare beneficiaries.  Congressional passage of the 1996 Kassebaum-Kennedy health care bill
(Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) authorized a four-year test of MSAs, limiting the number of
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first $500 of claims, employees were unaffected, but an interesting twist was added -- one that
reportedly influenced health care use and other forms of employee behavior.
Employees were informed that any portion of the $500 in the side-fund not used to cover
a worker’s initial claims would be received by that person upon quitting or retiring.  A worker
with only $200 in claims during the year, for example, would receive a $300 credit.  Yearly
credits would accumulate until voluntary severance.  This incentive provision had several potential
effects.  First, the rebate for low utilization allowed the individual to convert some "unused"
insurance into a future cash payment.  Second, since the size of the rebate diminished with
utilization, the employee now faced a shadow price (reduction in future bonus) for initial units of
care, even though this care was fully covered by the side-fund.  Third, beyond rewarding workers
for monitoring their own utilization and providers’ charges, it was thought that the incentive
structure might encourage healthier lifestyles that would reduce the need for care and allow
workers to enjoy better health and increased productivity, as well as future cash benefits.
Reactions to the Mendocino Plan and other incentive-based health plans have been
predictably mixed.  Employers and employees who participate in such programs often express
satisfaction with the results.  Insurers, especially those not offering incentive plans, usually resist
such approaches, perhaps because they often entail lower-premium policies.  Finally, some health
care providers and outside observers warn that incentive plans may deter preventive care and raise
overall health care costs.  Given the structure and potential effects of such plans, it is easy to
understand the conflicting views.  It is more difficult, given the scarcity of empirical or theoretical
research on such plans,2 to assess the actual merits or hazards of incentive-based health insurance.
The purpose of this paper is to offer a simple theoretical framework to address specific economic
questions raised by this class of insurance plans:  How do incentive plans influence consumer
behavior, particularly various forms of illness prevention, relative to behavior in traditional plans?
Can incentive plans benefit consumers and thereby lure them away from traditional plans?  Are
                                                                                                                                                    
tax-advantaged MSAs to 750,000 small-business or self-employed policyholders.  Swartz (1996) argues strongly
for researchers’ input into the design and monitoring of this demonstration project.
22. Zweifel (1992) analyzes the effects of German incentive plans, while Bogetic and Heffley (1993) provide a
detailed discussion of the Mendocino Plan and its potential application in other settings.  More recently, Hsiao
(1995) and Massaro and Wong (1995) offer conflicting views of Singapore's experience with MSAs.  Ozanne
(1996) gives some preliminary estimates of the cost-saving potential of MSAs.  More theoretical studies of the
efficiency of health care plans, such as Kamien and Schwartz (1973), Ellis and McGuire (1990), and Selden
(1990), have considered conventional coinsurance, capitation, or prospective reimbursement plans, but have not
examined the properties of MSAs or other incentive plans.
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incentive plans necessarily less profitable for insurers?  Do such plans result in “cream-skimming,”
leaving less healthy consumers facing higher costs in traditional plans?
Incentive plans may cause consumers to alter lifestyles, perhaps by engaging in healthy
activities, and to adjust their use of primary or preventive care.  To simplify the exposition, we
first consider a model where the probability of illness is influenced only by the consumer’s
inherent health status and a single choice variable: the consumer's outlay on uninsured healthy
activities (Section 2).  Consumer behavior in the incentive plan is compared to behavior in
traditional full insurance and standard deductible plans, where all three plans use experience rating
based on health status.  We also discuss implications for the insurer.  To address concerns about
potential “cream-skimming” in incentive plans, the model is modified to require community rating
for two groups of consumers with distinctly different health status levels (Section 3).  The
question of how incentive plans affect various forms of prevention is examined more completely
by expanding the original experience rating model to allow the consumer to invest in healthy
activities and preventive health care -- both expenditures lower the probability of illness, but the
first is uninsured and the latter is partially insured (Section 4).  In a concluding section, we recap
the key findings, discuss other extensions of the model, and rais  further questions about the
capacity of incentive-based insurance plans to improve efficiency in the health sector (Section 5).
2. The Simple Model.
To compare the essential features of an incentive plan with more conventional insurance
plans, we begin with a simple univariate model.  Initial notation is listed below.
y: consumer’s income;
h: consumer's outlay on uninsured healthy activities;
s: consumer’s exogenous health status (higher s indicates inherently better health);
p(h,s):probability of becoming ill;   ph < 0, phh > 0, ps < 0, phs < 0;
T: full cost of treatment in the event of illness (fixed);
d: uninsured dollar cost to consumer of becoming ill (lost wages, etc.);
E: target expenditure level under the incentive plan;
p: insurance premium.
The consumer here is risk-neutral and maximizes expected wealth by choosing h, the
outlay on healthy activities.3  Costs represented by h may be direct (health club memberships,
                                                 
33. Risk-aversion is crucial in understanding why individuals voluntarily pay more than actuarially f ir
premiums to purchase insurance, or why some purchase more insurance than others.  It is less critical in
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exercise equipment, etc.) or indirect, such as the opportunity cost of time used to exercise or
prepare healthier meals.4  We assume that h is uninsurable and therefore different from preventive
health care, which often is partially insured; the latter is introduced in Section 3.  The inherent
(exogenous) health status of the consumer is denoted by s, where higher values of s mean better
health.  We assume that the consumer knows s, which also can be observed by the insurer, based
on age, health history, physical examinations, and the like.  This observability of health status
allows the insurance contract to be conditioned on s, as in the case of experience rating.5  W
assume that a contract cannot be conditioned on h, the consumer’s investment in healthy
activities.
The assumption that phs < 0 implies that the marginal productivity of healthy activities is
higher for an inherently healthier person.  Someone with chronic back problems, for example, may
benefit little from joining a health club.  This may be the more plausible assumption, but the
reverse clearly could hold for some individuals or some types of chronic conditions.  Where
appropriate, we note how the assumption affects certain results.
The socially efficient level of healthy activities for a person of health status s, denoted
h*(s) or simply h*, minimizes the cost of such activities plus the expected social cost of being ill,
or
 h + p(h,s)(d+T), (1)
which yields the first-order condition
                                                                                                                                                    
understanding the response of insured individuals to the structure of the plan.  Moreover, the assumption of risk-
neutrality in the present context is not too restrictive because the consumer will have full health insurance against
the cost of treatment in the event of illness under both the traditional and incentive plans.  Landes and Posner
(1987, pp. 55-58) discuss this assumption in the context of liability rules in tort law.
Also note that the present U.S. tax exemption of health insurance premiums paid by employers and
employees offers large subsidies to the purchase of health insurance.  Under such conditions, individuals who are
risk-neutral (or even risk-seeking) may rationally insure.  Various proposals to make health insurance compulsory
(employer mandates or individual mandates) also suggest that risk-aversion is not a necessary condition for
insurance in a political economy.
44. We thank a referee for pointing out that our analysis of consumer behavior aimed at reducing the likelihood
of illness is similar to Ehrlich and Becker's (1972) analysis of "self-protection" as an alternative to market
insurance.  As in our model, their analysis shows that incentives to engage in self-protection are not solely derived
from risk-aversion and will exist in risk-neutral individuals as well.  Also consistent with our model, they show
that full insurance creates a moral hazard problem that reduces the incentive of consumers to engage in self-
protection.   However, this disincentive can be offset if the insurance premium is decreasing in the amount of self-
protection (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972: pp. 640-642).  In our model, we assume that this effect is absent since most
forms of healthy activity are difficult for insurers to monitor (i.e., we assume _p/_h = 0).
55. We do not consider the implications of risk factors known only to the consumer, since our concern here is
with moral hazard rather than adverse selection problems.  On the latter, see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) or Van
de Ven and Van Vliet (1995).
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1 + ph(h*,s) (d+T)  =  0. (2)
The second-order condition for a minimum holds, given phh > 0.  Implicit differentiation of (2)
shows that a healthier individual optimally invests more in healthy activities (_h*/_s = -phs/phh > 0)
when phs < 0.
2.1 Full Insurance Plan
When the consumer has no insurance and bears the full cost of h, d, and T, individual
maximization of expected wealth, EW = y-h-p(h,s)(d+T), satisfies (2) and therefore also
minimizes social costs.  On the other hand, if the consumer pays a fixed premium, p, to fully
insure for the cost of treating an illness, T, expected wealth is given by 6
EW = y - h - p(h,s)d - p. (3)
Here the fully insured consumer's choice of h, denoted (s) or simply h, solves
1 + ph(h,s)d  =  0. (4)
Because of the effect of s on the marginal benefit of healthy activities, ph(h,s)d, the consumer’s
choice of h under full insurance is sensitive to health status, but does not depend on whether or
not the premium is conditioned on s, since the consumer takes both p and s as given.  Comparing
(2) and (4) shows that h < h* for all s.7  Regardless of health status level, the consumer invests
too little in healthy activities from a social perspective.  This reflects the standard moral hazard
problem associated with full insurance, which causes the consumer to ignore the expected costs of
treatment, p(h,s)T.
In this section, we focus on experience rated insurance contracts, where the premium is
conditioned on s.  The expected return for the insurance company under this plan is given by 8
p(s) - p(h,s)T, (5)
where p(s) is the experience rated premium and p(h,s)T is the expected cost of health care when
the fully insured consumer chooses h.  If competition drives insurers’ profits to zero, p(s) =
p(h,s)T in equilibrium for all s.  Differentiating with respect to s shows that
ps = psT + ph(_h/_s)T < 0. (6)
Healthier consumers face lower premiums due to lower inherent risk of illness (first term) and
because they invest more in healthy activities (second term).  Had we assumed that sicker persons
                                                 
66. We assume that the cost d is not insured.
77. Equating the two conditions and rearranging terms gives: ph(h,s)/ph(h*,s) = (d+T)/d > 1 or, since ph < 0, it
follows that ph(h,s) < ph(h*,s).  This implies that h < h*, since phh > 0.
88. For simplicity, we assume that the insurer's administrative costs are zero here and in the other plans
considered.
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have a higher marginal productivity of h (i.e., phs > 0), the second effect would be positive and the
overall effect of s on the premium would be ambiguous. 
Substituting the equilibrium premium, p(s) = p(h,s)T, into (3), the consumer’s expected
wealth, conditional on s, becomes
EW(s) = y - h - p(h,s)(d+T). (7)
This is necessarily less than expected wealth if the consumer had chosen h* since, by definition, h*
minimizes h+p(h,s)(d+T) and therefore maximizes EW = y-h-p(h,s)(d+T).  Consumers ultimately
bear the inefficiency associated with moral hazard if insurance markets are sufficiently
competitive; but, as shown below, the insurance plan can be restructured to improve this
outcome.
2.2 Incentive Plan
Consider an alternative plan that provides full insurance for treatment costs, but which
also stipulates that if the consumer's health care spending during a given period falls below a
target level, the difference between the target and the actual spending is refunded to the
consumer.  As above, we assume that the terms of this plan can be conditioned on s.  Specifically,
the consumer receives full coverage for his treatment costs, plus an expected refund of
R(s) = E(s) - p(h,s)T,      if p(h,s)T < E(s),
                    (8)
R(s) = 0,                  if p(h,s)T ² E(s),
where E(s) is the expenditure target for consumers of health status s.  More compactly, the
expected refund is R(s) =  max{E(s)-p(h,s)T, 0}.
The consumer's expected wealth under the incentive plan is
  EW(s) = y - h - p(h,s)d + R(s) - p(s), (9)
where, for now, we assume that p(s) is the same premium as in the traditional plan. What choice
of h by the consumer maximizes this expression?  If R(s) = 0, that is if p(h,s)T ² E(s), the
expression is identical to (3) and the optimal choice is h.  C nsequently, if the expected refund is
zero, the consumer simply acts as if the plan were a traditional full insurance plan.  In contrast, if
the expected refund is positive, then substituting R(s) = E(s)-p(h,s)T into (9) gives EW(s) = y-h-
p(h,s)(d+T)+E(s)-p(s).  The first-order condition for maximization of this expression is the same
as (2), so the incentive plan consumer who anticipates a positive refund will choose h*, the
socially efficient level of healthy activities for his particular health status (recall that h* varies with
s).  The incentive plan causes the consumer to internalize the impact of his healthy activities on
the expected costs of treatment [i.e., the effect of h on p(h,s)T] through the refund.
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Whether the consumer chooses h* or h depends on the size of E(s).  In general, the larger
is E(s), the more likely the refund will be positive, and the more likely the consumer will prefer h*
to h.  Figure 1 illustrates a case where the consumer selects h*, and Figure 2 illustrates a case
where he chooses h.  Both figures graph the expressions y-h-p(h,s)d-p(s) [maximized at h] and y-
h-p(h,s)(d+T)+E(s)-p(s) [maximized at h*].  The first expression is relevant when p(h,s)T ² E(s)
and the refund is zero; the second is relevant when p(h,s)T < E(s) and the refund is positive.  The
transition point occurs where the curves intersect, since p(h,s)T = E(s) at that point.  This point is
labelled ho; when h < ho the leftmost curve is relevant, and when h > ho, the rig tmost curve is
relevant.  The upper envelope of the two curves is the relevant surface.  The amount of the refund
under the incentive plan is given by the vertical distance between the two curves to the right of ho
(see Figure 1).
[Figures 1 and 2]
The consumer's choice of h in the incentive plan is found by comparing the peaks of the
two curves.  In Figure 1, h* is preferred because
[y - h* - p(h*,s)(d+T) + E(s) - p(s)] >  [y - h - p(h,s)d - p(s)]. (10)
Here the incentive plan leads to a socially efficient level of healthy activities, h*, and reduces
p(h,s)T to a level where the consumer receives a rebate of E(s)-p(h*,s)T.  On the other hand, in
Figure 2, the above inequality is reversed and the incentive plan member chooses h, receiving no
rebate and behaving the same as a fully insured consumer with the same health status.
As E(s) is increased, the left-hand side of (10) increases (i.e., the rightmost curve in the
graphs shifts up).  Thus, there exists a critical value of E(s), denoted Ec(s), such that for E(s) <
Ec(s) the consumer chooses h, and for E(s) ² Ec(s) the consumer chooses h*.9  Figure 3 shows the
consumer's choice of h for various levels of E(s).  The expression for the critical target
expenditure level for a consumer of health status s, denoted Ec(s), is found by evaluating each
curve at its peak, equating the expressions, and solving for E:
Ec(s) = p(h*,s)T + [p(h*,s)d+h*] - [p(h,s)d+h]. (11)
Ec(s) is strictly positive given that [p(h*,s)d+h*]-[p(h,s)d+h] > 0, by definition of h as the value of
h that maximizes (3) and, hence, minimizes [p(h,s)d+h].  Thus, some expenditure target is
required to induce socially efficient behavior.  Also, by (11), the rebate at the consumer's point of
indifference between the two plans, Ec(s)-p(h*,s)T, is strictly positive.10
                                                 
99. We assume that when indifferent the consumer chooses h*.
1010.In Figure 1, it is easy to see that when the target is high enough that the two curves attain the same height,
thereby defining Ec(s), the rebate at h* will remain strictly positive.
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[Figure 3]   
From (11) we can determine how Ec(s) varies with s:11
_Ec/_s = ps(h*,s)T + [ps(h*,s)-ps(h,s)]d  < 0, (12)
where the expression in brackets is negative by phs < 0, given that h* > h.  Thus, the critical target
spending level needed to draw consumers into the incentive plan and to induce efficient behavior
is lower for healthier consumers.12  This result shows that even less healthy consumers can be
drawn into an incentive plan and induced to choose an efficient level of healthy activities, h*,
provided the target spending level is set sufficiently high.  Relaxing the spending target by setting
it higher gives even consumers with poorer health an opportunity to benefit from the refund
incentive by investing more in healthy activities and reducing the probability of illness.  This
contradicts the view that incentive plans inevitably lead to “cream-skimming” and the isolation of
less healthy consumers in traditional plans.
In addition to varying with a consumer’s health status, Ec(s) is sensitive to the fixed cost of
treatment [_Ec/_T = p(h*,s) > 0], the consumer’s uninsured dollar cost of becoming ill [_Ec/_d =
p(h*,s)-p(h,s) < 0], and the technology of prevention, p(h,s).  This sensitivity argues strongly for
the need to adjust the expenditure target as underlying conditions of the medical marketplace
change.13
The preceding analysis shows that it is possible to induce consumers of varying health
status to choose efficient levels of healthy activities under the incentive plan.  The next question is
whether the insurer also has an incentive to offer this plan.  Does the incentive plan increase the
insurer's return relative to the traditional plan?  Recall that (5) gives the insurer's expected return
under the traditional plan.  Assuming the same premium p(s), and retaining the assumption of
experience rating, the expected return from insuring a person of health status s under the incentive
plan is the premium less the expected cost of treatment and the expected rebate, or p(s)-p(h,s)T-
max{E(s)-p(h,s)T, 0}.  Given optimal consumer behavior under the incentive plan, the expected
rebate must be positive [see (11) or Figure 1], so the insurer’s expected return is simply p(s)-E(s).
If it offers the plan, the insurer will set E(s) as low as possible, while still inducing the consumer
                                                 
1111.The Envelope Theorem was used to eliminate terms associated with _h*/_s and _h/_s.
1212.If phs > 0, the impact of health status on the critical target spending would be ambiguous, but there would still
exist a critical value for any observed s.
1313.The Mendocino Plan has retained the initial $500 expenditure target, but has adjusted other terms of the
contract, including the introduction of a 20% coinsurance rate for the first $2,000 above the $500 target, giving an
out-of-pocket limit of $400.  Other adjustments include coverage for means of contraception and provisions for
domestic partners.
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to choose h*.  Levels of E(s) > Ec(s) yield no further increase in the consumer's healthy activities
(recall Figure 3), thus the insurer will set E(s) = Ec(s), yielding a return of
p(s) - Ec(s). (13)
From (5), the expected return to the insurer offering full coverage, absent competition,
was           p(s)-p(h,s)T.  The incentive plan will therefore provide the uncontested insurer a
greater return on a person with health status s if p(h,s)T > Ec(s).  Using Ec(s), as defined by (11),
we get
p(h,s)T - Ec(s)  = [p(h,s)(d+T) + h] - [p(h*,s)(d+T) + h*]  >  0, (14)
where the inequality follows by definition of h*.14
In an uncontested environment, insurers earn a greater return by offering the incentive
plan because it induces consumers to invest more in healthy activities.  But if free entry exists,
competition among insurers will cause the incentive plan premium, experience rated for each s, to
fall until a zero return prevails.  That is, p(s) = Ec(s) in a competitive equilibrium.  Since _Ec/_s <
0, by (12), healthy consumers would be charged less than unhealthy consumers, but they would
also have lower (more restrictive) target levels of spending.
Given competition, the expected wealth of the incentive plan member with health status s
is
EW*(s) = y -h* - p(h*,s)d + [Ec(s) - p(h*,s)T] - p(s) = y - h* - p(h*,s)(d+T).(15)
Comparing this to the consumer's expected wealth under the traditional full coverage plan in (7)
shows that EW*(s) > EW(s).  Thus, when insurance companies are competitive and spending
targets are properly set, consumers at all health status levels strictly benefit from the incentive
plan and insurers do no worse (zero profits).  Competition forces insurers to pass the increased
returns under the incentive plan to consumers in the form of lower net insurance costs.  These
lower net costs reflect the social gains from inducing consumers to choose efficient levels of
healthy activities.  If profits are not driven to zero and social gains are shared between consumers
and insurers, both parties can benefit from a move from full coverage to incentive-based
insurance.
2.3 Traditional Insurance with a Deductible
Part 2.2 compared the incentive plan to a full insurance plan that overed all health care
costs.  In reality, traditional insurance plans sometimes confront the moral hazard problem of too
                                                 
1414.This dominance of the incentive plan requires that the insurer be able to determine Ec(s). We show that Ec(s)
exists but, as a practical matter, determination of the critical target for any given health status is likely to require
market iterations by profit-seeking insurers.
-10-
little h by imposing a deductible that requires consumers to pay the first D dollars of their health
care costs, after which additional costs are partly or fully covered, depending on the presence of
coinsurance.  This section compares a simple deductible policy, with full coverage beyond the
deductible, to the incentive plan.
Under a policy with a deductible of D(s), which again depends on observed health status,
the consumer's expected health care costs are
p(h,s)T,      if p(h,s)T < D(s),
(16)
                 D(s), if p(h,s)T ² D(s).
That is, the consumer's  expected  costs  are  min{p(h,s)T, D(s)}.  Expected  wealth  under  this
deductible policy is
EW(s) = y - h - p(h,s)d - min{p(h,s)T, D(s)} - p(s). (17)
Since the consumer views D(s) as fixed, he will choose h if min{p(h,s)T, D(s)} = D(s),  but  he
will  choose h* if min{p(h,s)T, D(s)} = p(h,s)T.  The condition for the consumer to choose h* is
 [y - h* - p(h*,s)(d+T) - p(s)]   >  [y - h - p(h,s)d - D(s) - p(s)], (18)
which is satisfied for a sufficiently large D(s).  That is, a large enough deductible will induce the
consumer to choose the efficient h.
       From the equality version of (18), the lowest level of D(s) that accomplishes this is
   Dc(s) = p(h*,s)T + [p(h*,s)d+h*] - [p(h,s)d+h]. (19)
This strictly positive result is identical to (11), the expression for Ec(s).  Like the critical refund in
the efficient incentive plan, the critical deductible forces the consumer to internalize the full
expected cost of treatment.  Yet the plans do differ. The consumer expects to pay the full cost of
treatment under an efficient deductible plan, given that Dc(s) > p(h*,s)T by (19), though in the
event of illness it is likely that Dc(s) < T.  In contrast, all of the consumer's expected treatment
costs are covered in the efficient in tive plan, and he is reimbursed for the excess of Ec(s) over
p(h*,s)T.  This is possible, in a competitive environment, because the consumer pays p(s) = Ec(s)
up front as a premium, whereas under the efficient deductible plan the consumer pays a smaller
premium, but then also must pay up to Dc(s) of T when illness occurs.
A useful way to think about the difference between the efficient deductible plan and the
efficient incentive plan involves the notions of health risk and income risk.15  In both plans, the
consumer faces a health risk, which is realized when illness occurs.  The size of this risk, p(h*,s),
is the same in both plans if rebates and deductibles are properly set.  The two plans differ, though,
in the form and timing of income risk.  Under the deductible plan, the consumer faces income risk
                                                 
1515.We thank one of the refere s for making this point.
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in the form of uncertain out-of-pocket health care expenditures, up to the amount of the
deductible, when illness occurs.  Under the incentive plan, income risk takes the form of an
uncertain refund of the initial premium payment at some later date.  The incentive plan therefore
offers the advantage of eliminating the correlation between the consumer’s health risk and income
risk that characterizes the deductible plan.  The price of eliminating this correlation of risks is a
higher premium in the incentive plan than in the deductible plan.16
3. The Model with Community Rating.
We have compared the incentive plan with full insurance and with a deductible plan,
assuming that all insurance contracts were experience rated for consumers of differing health
status.  A frequent criticism of incentive plans like MSAs, however, has been that they will attract
healthier consumers away from traditional plans, thereby raising premiums for the remaining, less
healthy, consumers (Nichols, 1995; Urban Institute, 1996).  This argument is based on a
community rating system that constrains insurers to charge enrollees the same premium regardless
of health status.  We examine this criticism by now comparing a traditional insurance plan and an
incentive plan for the case where insurers cannot condition contracts on s.
To keep the analysis simple, consider the special ca e where phs = 0.  That is, health status
does not affect the marginal productivity of healthy activities; it simply affects the risk of illness.
To capture this case, let p(h,s) = p(h)-s, where p’ < 0, p” > 0.17  Further suppose that there are
two groups, those with good health, or health status sg, and those with poor health, sp, where sg >
sp.  If a is the fraction of consumers with good health, the average health status of the population
is defined as sa = asg+(1-a)sp.
3.1 Community Rated Full Insurance
Under full insurance with pooled risk groups, all consumers pay the same premium p,
regardless of health status.  A type j consumer has expected wealth of
EWj =  y - h - [p(h)-sj]d - p,     j = g,p (20)
and chooses h to solve
                                                 
1616.Recall, from (13), that under competitive conditions the incentive plan premium equals Ec(s).  Th
competitive premium for the efficient deductible plan equals p(h*,s)[T-Dc( )].  But, from (11) and (19), Ec(s  =
Dc(s) = p(h*,s)T + [p(h*,s)d+h*] - [p(h,s)d+h].  It follows that the incentive plan premium exceeds the deductible
plan premium by [p(h*,s)]2T + [1+p(h*,s)]{ [p(h*,s)d+h*] - [p(h,s)d+h] }.  This expression is strictly positive,
since the final bracketed term is positive by definition of h as the value of h that maximizes (3) and, hence,
minimizes [p(h,s)d+h].
1717.This separable form for p(h,s) allows us to isolate the incentive effects of insurance from its pooling effect
under a community rating system.
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1 + p'(h)d = 0, (21)
where h is independent of s, given the assumed form of p(h,s).  The competitive insurance
premium in this case is
p = [p(h)-sa]T, (22)
and the equilibrium expected wealth level of a type j consumer is
EWj = y - h - p(h)(d+T) + sjd + saT,     j = g,p. (23)
Note that the final term, saT, captures the pooling of risks.  Specifically, consumers in good health
subsidize the treatment costs of those in poor health, since sg > sa > p.
3.2 Community Rated Incentive Plan
Now consider an incentive plan that also does not discriminate based on health status.
Any consumer who chooses such a plan will pay the same premium and face the same target
spending level, E, regardless of his or her health status.  Under such a plan, the expected refund
for a type j consumer is
Rj = max{E-[p(h)-sj]T, 0}, (24)
and the consumer's expected wealth is
EWj = y - h - [p(h)-sj]d + Rj - p
        = y - h - [p(h)-sj](d+T) + E - p,    j = g,p (25)
where E and p are independent of s.  The choice of h that maximizes this expression, assuming a
positive refund, is h*, the socially efficient level of healthy activities, which is independent of s by
the separability of p(h,s) and independent of the insurance contract terms E and p, which the
consumer takes as given.
As before, we can derive the minimum target expenditure level that just induces a
consumer to choose the incentive plan over full insurance (assuming the same premium for each):
Ecj = [p(h*)-sj]T + [h*+p(h*)d] - [h+p(h)d],     j = g,p (26)
Only the first term in (26) depends on sj, and since sg > sp, it follows that Ecg < Ecp; the minimum
target level of expenditures is lower for healthier consumers, consistent with (12).  Since any
target level greater than Ecj will attract a consumer of type j from the full insurance plan, it is
possible to attract only healthy consumers by setting a target level between Ecg and Ecp, though the
reverse is not possible.  This is consistent with the claim that incentive plans may "skim the
cream" from traditional, community rated insurance plans, increasing the cost of insurance to less
healthy consumers who remain in the traditional plan.  Specifically, saT will fal  to spT in (22),
raising the competitive insurance premium in the traditional plan.
-13-
“Cream-skimming” is possible, but not inevitable.  Suppose that the target is set to induce
both types of consumers to choose the incentive plan.  The minimum target level that
accomplishes this pooling is Ecp.  The insurer’s expected cost under this plan is the expected cost
of treatment plus the expected refund, or
[p(h*)-sa]T + {Ecp - [p(h*)-saT]} = Ecp. (27)
Thus, the competitive premium that insurers will charge for this pooled incentive plan is p = Ecp.
Substituting this into (25) we obtain
EWj* = y - h* - [p(h*)-sj](d+T),    j = g,p. (28)
Finally, we can compare the expected wealth of a consumer under the pooled traditional and
pooled incentive plans by calculating the difference between (28) and (23) for both types of
consumers:
EWj*-EWj = [h+p(h)(d+T)] - [h*+p(h*)(d+T)] + (sj-sa)T,     j = g,p. (29)
The first two bracketed terms are on net positive and are independent of the consumer's
health status.18  This represents the efficiency gain from the incentive plan over full insurance, and
is available to consumers, independent of health status.  The final term is positive for consumers in
good health (sg > sa), but negative for consumers in poor health (sp < sa).  It represents the fact that
healthier consumers cross-subsidize less healthy ones under traditional pooled insurance.  This
factor reinforces the efficiency gain of the incentive plan for healthy consumers and offsets the
efficiency gain for less healthy ones.  If the efficiency gain is strong enough, however, consumers
in poor health may still enjoy a net gain under the incentive plan.
It is worth noting why the incentive plan in this section allows the healthy to avoid being
pooled with consumers in poor health, even though they pay the same premium and face the same
expenditure target.  The key is that the refunds are not pooled.  Although all consumers pay the
same amount up-front to purchase the policy under community rating, the expected refunds of
consumers in good health exceed the expected refunds of consumers in poor health [see (24)].
4. The Consumer Also Chooses Preventive Health Care.
The univariate choice models in Sections 2 and 3 capture the essential differences between
the incentive plan and more conventional forms of health insurance (full coverage and deductible
plans), under both experience and community rating systems.  In those models the consumer’s
outlay on healthy activities reduces the probability of illness, conditional on his given health status,
                                                 
1818.The fact hat these two terms are independent of s follows from our assumption, in Section 3, that p(h,s) is
separable in h and s.
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but this personal outlay is not insured.  Only the direct cost of treatment, T, is covered.  In reality,
consumers face another type of expenditure that may be partially insured and which also affects
the probability of illness, namely the expenditure on preventive care, including routine medical
check-ups.  It is important to consider this extension, since critics of incentive plans often claim
that the reward structure of such plans discourages preventive care and increases the likelihood of
illness.  Let the consumer's expenditures on both healthy activities, h, and preventive care, x,
reduce the probability of illness, conditional on health status, or
  p(h,x,s),     ph, px, ps < 0,   phh, pxx > 0,   phhpxx > phx2.       (30)
Also, since we limit attention in this section to experience rated plans, the terms of insurance
(premium, expenditure target, deductible) should be interpreted as functions of s.
First consider the socially efficient levels of healthy activities and preventive care.  The
socially efficient combination, (h*(s),x*(s)) or simply (h*,x*) minimizes overall expected costs,
including the consumer's transaction costs, given by    
h + x(1+t) + p(h,x,s)(d+T), (31)
where t represents the transaction cost of consuming preventive health care, expressed as a
fraction of preventive expenditures.  We introduce t to capture the full social cost of preventive
care, which includes not only the full charges, x, which may be partially insured, but also the time,
travel, or other indirect costs of consuming preventive care that are not insurable.  This distinction
did not arise with h, since both the direct and indirect costs of engaging in healthy activities were
assumed to be uninsurable.  The resulting first-order conditions are
1 + ph(h*,x*,s)(d+T) = 0, (32)
coinsurance rate c for the direct dollar costs of prevention (0 < c < 1).  The consumer's expected
wealth under this plan is
   EW = y - h - p(h,x,s)d - (c+t)x - p, (34)
where the consumer again takes the insurance premium, p, as given. The consumer’s choices of h
and x, denoted (h(s),x(s)) or simply (h,x), satisfy the conditions
1 + ph(h,x,s)d  =  0, (35)
   (c+t) + px(h,x,s)d = 0. (36)
Sign restrictions i  (30) ensure that (,x) is a maximum.  Condition (35) is the same as (4),
and again suggests that, from a social perspective, the consumer underinvests in healthy activities
in the traditional plan.  The latter condition (36) contains two sources of inefficiency.  First, given
full insurance, the consumer ignores the cost of treatment, T.  This tends to lower x below x*.  On
the other hand, if the consumer pays less than the full cost of prevention (c < 1), he will tend to
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consume more than x*.  Note that the tendency to underconsume x is due to full insurance for
treatment charges, whereas the tendency to overconsume x is due to partial insurance for the
costs of prevention.  In combination, these two effects can result in either too much or too little
prevention.  Comparing (35) and (36) to the conditions that define socially efficient behavior, (32)
and (33), it is clear that consumer’s choice of both h and x in the traditional plan may be distorted.
If premiums are experience rated, the expected return to the insurance company under this
traditional plan is given by
   p(s) - (1-c)x - p(h,x,s)T. (37)
In a competitive market, (37) equals zero, so the consumer's expected wealth becomes
    EW(s) = y - h - p(h,x,s)(d+T) - (1+t)x. (38)
Now consider the incentive plan when expenditures on both healthy activities and
preventive care are choice variables.  The refund in (8) becomes
            R(s) = max{E(s)-p(h,x,s)T-(l-c)x, 0}. (39)
This specification assumes that the refund is based on the in urer's shareof expected health costs
compared to the target expenditure, E(s). Thus, it depends on the rate of coinsurance, c, for
preventive care. The expected wealth of the consumer under this plan is
EW(s) = y - h - p(h,x,s)d + max{E(s)-p(h,x,s)T-(1-c)x, 0} - ( +t)x - p(s). (40)
If the refund is positive, (40) becomes
  EW(s) = y - h - p(h,x,s)(d+T) - (1+t)x - p(s , (41)
which the consumer maximizes by choosing (h*,x*), since the first-order conditions for (41) are
identical to (32) and (33).  Proceeding as above, we can show that the consumer will make this
socially efficient choice, rather than (h,x), if E(s) is larger than a critical value, given by
Ec(s) = p(h*,x*,s)T + (1-c)x* + [p(h*,x*,s)T + h* + (c+t)x*]
       - [p(h,x,s)T + h + (c+t)x] > 0. (42)
Zero profit for insurers implies that, in equilibrium, p(s) = Ec(s).  The equilibrium expected wealth
of consumers is
EW*(s) = y - h* - p(h*,x*,s)(d+T) - (1+t)x*, (43)
which is strictly larger than EW(s) in (38).
The preceding analysis shows that the incentive plan, with Ec(s) properly chosen, can
induce not only the efficient level of healthy activities (as in Section 2) but also the efficient level
of preventive care for consumers with varying health status levels.  The question of whether the
plan reduces the level of preventive care, as critics contend, depends on whether consumers were
over- or underconsuming prevention in the traditional plan.  If individuals were consuming too
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little preventive care in the traditional plan, due to full coverage of treatment, a properly
structured incentive plan will lead to higher, socially efficient levels of prevention.  Conversely, if
traditional plan consumers were overconsuming preventive care due to moral hazard effects, the
appropriate incentive plan would indeed reduce prevention, but only to socially efficient levels.
5. Summary and Possible Extensions.
Opponents of incentive-based health insurance plans emphasize two potential problems:
“cream-skimming” and reductions in preventive care.  This study directly addresses both issues.
After recapping the point that full coverage of treatment causes underinvestment in healthy
activities (Section 2.1) -- an uninsured and unobserved form of prevention -- we explore the
efficiency properties of a simple incentive-based insurance plan that rewards consumers who keep
the expected treatment costs paid by the insurer below some target expenditure level (Section
2.2).  Results show that, under experience rating, where insurers can condition the premium and
expenditure target on a person’s observable health status, individuals can be induced to select
socially efficient levels of healthy activities, provided that the expenditure target is set sufficiently
high.  Less healthy consumers require higher targets to induce incentive plan participation and
socially efficient behavior, but properly constructed targets can improve the expected wealth of
consumers at all health status levels, without reducing insurers’ profits.  This system of targets is
sensitive to the costs of treatment, the dollar costs to the consumer of becoming ill, and the
technology of illness-prevention, but competitive market pressures to attract consumers might
prompt insurers to make many of these marginal adjustments.
We also point out the similarities between the incentive plan and a traditional deductible
plan (Section 2.3).  As with the introduction of an expenditure target, the deductible gives the
insurer an extra optimization instrument -- an additional term of insurance.  In this sense, it is not
surprising that both approaches are Pareto-improving when correctly implemented.  Both the
rebate and the deductible, when properly structured, force the consumer to face the full expected
costs of illness, but the two plans differ in the timing of the consumer's payment for this cost.
Difference between these plans may be even more apparent in a less static framework where the
timing of costs matters.  Similarly, in a framework where consumer psychology is allowed to be
more complex, carrots and sticks of equal size could have different consequences.  In would be
useful to explore the differences between the various types of plans in a more dynamic model that
also allows for the possibility of asymmetric response to penalties and inducements.
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A more dynamic framework also would lend itself to a practical aspect of incentive plans
that we have not explicitly addressed: the rules governing the accumulation and distribution of
savings.  In particular, is the consumer's expected refund paid periodically, or is it accumulated for
lump-sum distribution at a specified future date?  How do consumers and insurers share the
interest accrued on positive balances in the consumer’s account?   Deferred or partial access to
accumulated savings reduces the present value of the refund. Consequently, the smaller the
consumer’s share of accumulated savings, the longer the wait for the reward, or the higher the
rate of time preference, the larger the expenditure target would need to be to attract participation
in the incentive plan and to induce socially efficient behavior.
The second major issue of “cream-skimming” is taken up in Section 3, where experience
rating is replaced by community rating and the health status continuum is replaced by two groups
of consumers with distinctly different health status levels.  Again, full insurance is analyzed briefly
and the usual cross-subsidization, under community rating, from healthy to unhealthy consumers
is shown (Section 3.1).  Analysis of a community rated incentive plan shows that “cream-
skimming” is possible but not inevitable (Section 3.2).  Setting the expenditure target just high
enough to attract the healthy away from the traditional plan does result in separation of the
groups.  However, setting the expenditure target high enough to attract the unhealthy, and
thereby inducing socially efficient behavior by this group, also will attract the healthy, who only
require a lower target to join the incentive plan and to adopt efficient behavior.  Provided
insurance markets are competitive, both groups gain from improved incentive effects, but the
removal of cross-subsidies that exist under community rated full insurance plans favors the
healthy.  Thus, under community rating, the healthy are unambiguously better off in the incentive
plan.  The unhealthy may gain or lose, depending on the size of the incentive effects relative to the
size of the (eliminated) cross-subsidies.  This finding does not erase concerns about “cream-
skimming,” but suggests that it is wrong to assume that incentive plans necessarily harm less
healthy consumers.
Section 4 extends the model to provide a more complete analysis of the effects of
incentive plans on prevention.  In addition to investing in uninsured healthy activities, the
individual consumes preventive health care, which is partially insured.  Traditional insurance plans
cause underinvestment in healthy activities, but may result in either too little or too much
consumption of preventive health care due to two opposing effects: partial coverage of preventive
care encourages its consumption, relative to the uninsured case, while more complete coverage of
treatment costs reduces the incentive to consume preventive care.  Analysis of the incentive plan
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again shows that, for any particular health status level, the target level of expenditure can be
constructed to induce selection of the incentive plan over the traditional plan and to achieve
socially efficient levels of investment in both healthy activities and preventive care.  If preventive
care was “too low” in the traditional plan, the incentive plan will increase it;  if the level was “too
high,” the incentive plan will trim preventive care to a socially efficient level.
Thus far, incentive-based health insurance plans have been used sparingly.  Typically they
have been introduced by self-insured employers seeking innovative ways to control health care
costs, though the Mendocino Plan highlights the fact that only partial self-insurance may be
needed to implement such an approach.  The current limited federal experiment with MSAs could
lead to wider support for incentive plans, but state-mandated coverage requirements and
traditional insurers' lack of enthusiasm pose significant barriers.  The results summarized above
suggest that experiments with incentive-based health insurance could lead to beneficial changes in
the structure of insurance, but success of these experiments will depend on contract features that
are shaped by market conditions as well as federal and state restrictions.  Further theoretical and
empirical studies of how such parameters influence plan selection and utilization of services within
plans could be useful in designing efficient incentive plans and refining policy restrictions.19
                                                 
1919. Van de Ven and Van Vliet (1995) empirically analyze the role of risk-adjusted premiums in reducing the
potential for adverse selection in insurance markets.  The plans that are analyzed contain no incentive component,
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